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NOTES
Billings v. Atkinson: Texas Recognizes Invasion of the Right of
Privacy as an Actionable Tort
Defendant, an employee of the telephone company, placed a wiretap
device in the terminal box of the plaintiff's telephone. Plaintiff sued the
defendant and the telephone company for invasion of privacy. The dis-
trict court directed a verdict for the telephone company since the defendant
was acting outside the scope of his orders when he installed the device and
since the telephone company had fired the defendant as soon as it identified
him. The court submitted the case on special issues for invasion of the
plaintiff's right of privacy. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded
compensatory and punitive damages. The judge granted the defendant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that Texas
did not recognize invasion of privacy as an actionable tort. The court of
civil appeals affirmed.1  Held, reversed: Texas now recognizes the right
of privacy; invasion of the right of privacy is a legal wrong for which Texas
courts will grant a remedy. Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex.
1973).
I. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Warren and Brandeis. Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis formally
proposed legal recognition of the right to privacy in a law review article
in 1890.2 The right to privacy was an interest which the individual had in
his personal life,3 but which was partially, though inadequately, protected in
the common law by such actions as defamation, libel, and slander. War-
ren and Brandeis made broad suggestions about the nature of their new tort,
but did not define it with great precision. Essentially, they argued that the
individual had a right to be left alone if he chose to lead an anonymous life.
The remedies for invasion of the right would be damages and injunctive
relief. Since the gravamen of the tort was invasion of a legal right, the two
lawyers did not believe that special damages were necessary to maintain
the action or to recover general damages. The law would infer damages
from violation of a legal right.4
Nature of the Tort. Since the appearance of their article, Warren and
1 Billings v. Atkinson, 471 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971).
2 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rav. 193 (1890). But see
Hadley, The Right to Privacy, 3 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1894).
3 The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization,
have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the
refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so
that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual;
but modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his pri-
vacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be
inflicted by mere bodily injury.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 196.
4 Id. at 214-19.
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Brandeis have influenced courts which have had occasion to consider the
right to privacy. Their proposals were broad and were made primarily in
response to the unwanted publicity generated by contemporary mass-circula-
tion newspapers. Probably as a result of the initial absence of precision in
their proposals, no one type of tort action for the invasion of the right of
privacy has been formulated over the years. 5 The result has been judicial
recognition of four distinct and perhaps unrelated actions by the defendant
which constitute invasion of the right of privacy. Prosser has categorized
these invasions as: 1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude,
or into his private affairs. 2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private
facts about the plaintiff. 3. Publicity placing the plaintiff in a false light
in the public eye. 4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage,
of the plaintiff's name or likeness. 6 The essential element of each classi-
fication is invasion; the defendant is liable when he has violated the plain-
tiff's legal right to be left alone. The plaintiff need allege nothing else.
Thus, by the law of most jurisdictions which recognize the tort, publica-
tion is not necessary when the defendant intrudes into the plaintiff's solitude.7
Physical injurys and special damages9 need not be proven for recovery of
5 It is important to note that the tort remedy for invasion of the legal right of privacy
differs from the right of privacy guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
Justices of the Supreme Court have found the right of privacy in various parts of the
Constitution: the Ist, 4th, 5th, 9th, and 14th amendments, as well as in the penumbra
of the Bill of Rights. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (9th and 14th amend-
ments); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (9th and 14th amendments); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (1st and 14th amendments); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968) (4th and 5th amendments); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
(4th and 5th amendments); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (penumbra);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (14th amendment). See also The Supreme
Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 57, 75-85 (1973).
Justice Hugo Black vigorously and consistently dissented, basing his arguments on the
absence of any mention of privacy in the Constitution. "[T]his Court, which I did
not understand to have the power to sit as a court of common law, now appears to
be exalting a phrase which Warren and Brandeis used in discussing grounds for tort
relief, to the level of a constitutional rule which prevents the legislatures from passing
any law deemed by this Court to interfere with 'privacy.'" Griswold v. Connecticut,
481 U.S. 479, 510 n.1 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); accord, Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 70 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
The Court has yet to define the constitutional right of privacy with much more
specificity than a "zone of privacy" which the individual has and into which the gov-
ernment cannot intrude. Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude,
31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 272, 276 (1966). Presently, the constitutional right
to privacy protects at least some areas of human conduct such as abortion, search and
seizure, and marriage. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (search and seizure); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (marriage). There is perhaps an overlapping with the intrusion aspect of
the tort remedy, but the tort of invasion of privacy is not of federal constitutional
dimensions. Some states find the tort right of privacy guaranteed by the state con-
stitution or bill of rights. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91, 93 (1931)
(unauthorized use of plaintiff's life history in movie); Pavesich v. New England Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 71 (1905) (photograph in advertising);
Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076, 1078-79 (1911) (photograph in
advertising); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22, 30 (1922).6 See W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTs 804-15 (4th ed. 1971). See also Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389, 392 (1960).
7 LaCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel., 114 Ohio App. 299, 182 N.E.2d 15 (1961) (wiretap).
8 McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810
(1939) (eavesdropping with mechanical devices).
9 Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (Ct. App. 1931) (wiretap).
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damages. Truth is no defense to publication of private facts.1 0  The action
is a personal one which does not survive the plaintiff's death and which must
be sued upon by the person injured.'" Invasion of the right of privacy
is a dignatory tort for which courts will infer damages once the plaintiff has
proved the requisite invasion. 1 2  It is important to note that the tort is not
the invasion of the plaintiff's privacy, but rather the invasion of the plain-
tiff's legal right to privacy.
Judicial Recognition. In 1905 the Supreme Court of Georgia was the
first court to accept the right of privacy.' 3 The courts in most states now
recognize the tort,14 or have indicated that they will recognize the right
to privacy when the issue of recognition is squarely presented. 15 The courts
in several of the states, including Texas, have candidly admitted that the
trend of the law favored recognition.' 6 The legislatures of four states have
protected by statute the right of privacy which the plaintiff has in his own
likeness or name, and have provided civil remedies for wrongful appropria-
tion of name or likeness. 17 Since the Billings decision, there remain but
three states which flatly reject the right of privacy, i8 and there is indication
of judicial dissatisfaction with present law in at least one of those states. 19
Rejection by Texas Courts. Prior to Billings, Texas courts consistently
refused to consider the tort. Few plaintiffs have, therefore, attempted to
10 Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944) (publication of book in-
cluding discussion of plaintiff).11 Young v. That Was The Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ohio 1969)
(use of dead woman's name on national television).
12 D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 530-31 (1973).
13 Pavesich v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905)(unauthorized use of photograph in advertising). The Restatement of Torts preceded
many states in recognizing the right of privacy. Entitled "Interference with Privacy,"§ 867 provides: "A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's
interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public
is liable to the other." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939). The comments to
this section reflect that "[t]his interest appears only in a comparatively highly developed
state of society. It has not been recognized until recently." Id. comment b at 399.
14 For lists of cases, see D. PEMBER, PRIvACY AND THE PRESS 264-66 (1972); W.
PROSSER, supra note 6, at 802-18; Prosser, supra note 6, at 384-89; Annot., 14
A.L.R.2d 750, 753-54 (1950). Note that not all states have ruled on the tort of in-
vasion of privacy.
15 Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Co., 351 Mass. 53, 217 N.E.2d 736 (1966) (news-
paper story and photograph); Martin v. Dorton, 210 Miss. 668, 50 So. 2d 391 (1951)
(news story).
16 Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d 118 (1948) (news story about deceased
father); Kom v. Rennison, 21 Conn. Supp. 400, 156 A.2d 476 (Super. Ct. 1959)(photograph in advertising); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973); Roach
v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958) (listening device in tenant's
apartment).
17 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§9 839.1-.3 (1922); UTAH CODE ANN. H§ 76-4-8, -9 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-650
(1957).
18 Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955) (plaintiff
placed in false light because of defendant's publicity stunt); Henry v. Cherry & Webb,
30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909) (photograph in advertising); Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye
Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936) (defendant distributed
handbills about plaintiff's debt).
19 "The court feels that the right of privacy is destined for universal recognition,
and it applauds this destiny as founded in the most basic concepts of human rights."




base a suit upon a theory of privacy. In 1941, a famous football player
was unable to maintain an action on privacy for the unauthorized use of
his photograph.2 0  In Milner v. Red River Valley Publishing Co. 21 the
alleged invasion was a story in the defendant's newspaper about the criminal
record of the plaintiff's dead father. The court refused to recognize the
right of privacy, relying on the court's traditional and limiting view of
Texas common law:
Our Texas courts are limited to the enforcement of rights under the
common law as it existed on January 20, 1840, unless changed, modi-
fied, added to, or repealed by statute. . . . The right of privacy as
such, not being recognized under the common law, as it existed when
we adopted it, and our Legislature not having given such right by
statute, no recovery can be had in Texas under the facts in this record.22
The court's interpretation of the common law as a fixed structure which
can be changed only by the legislature prompted immediate criticism, -2 3
but Texas courts, as well as federal courts applying Texas law, followed
the Milner decision.24
II. BILLINGS V. ATKINSON
The Right. The Billings court recognized the right of privacy as it has been
defined by most courts and writers. The court defined the right as:
[1] the right to be free from unwarranted appropriation or exploita-
tion of one's personality,
[2] the right to be free from the publicizing of one's private affairs
with which the public has no legitimate concern, or
[3] the right to be free from the wrongful intrusion into one's private
activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering,
shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.25
This definition encompassed the four variations of the tort-appropria-
20 O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941). When considering
the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's signature, another court commented that the
right might exist in Texas, but the facts of the case did not require a conclusion on
its existence. United States Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 238 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1951), error ref. n.r.e.
21 249 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952). Milner has usually been the
case cited to indicate rejection of the tort by Texas courts.
22 Id. at 229. The Supreme Court of Texas also relied on this interpretation of the
common law when it initially refused to recognize the tort of intentional infliction of
mental distress. Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
23 Seavey argued that the courts have recognized new areas of the law numerous
times in the past, and Texas courts should thus recognize the right of privacy. Com-
ment, Can Texas Courts Protect Newly-Discovered Interests?, 31 TEXAS L. REV. 309(1953).24 McCullagh v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 211 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1954) (news story
about plaintiff); Hansson v. Harris, 252 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952),
error ref. n.r.e. (circulation of police photograph of unindicted plaintiff). The court
of civil appeals affirmed Billings, relying in part on Milner. 471 S.W.2d 908, 912-15
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971), rev'd, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
Relief for invasion of privacy was also denied when the plaintiff failed to plead trespass,
wiretapping, or other act which the court required for invasion. Payne v. Laughlin,
486 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972).
25 Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex. 1973). This definition parallels
the one in 62 AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 1 (1972).
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tion, publicity, disclosure, intrusion-which Prosser categorized as falling
within the right of privacy. 26
Implicity rejecting the Milner rationale, the Billings court decided that it
could base recognition of the tort on common law and Texas precedent. 27
Warren and Brandeis had located the right to privacy within the expansive
common law and argued for separate recognition of an existing but then
inchoate right. 28  The Billings court agreed. Texas courts had previously
granted relief for what was essentially invasion of privacy when the plain-
tiff alleged "libel and slander, wrongful search and seizure, eavesdropping
and wiretapping, and other similar invasions into the private business and
personal affairs of an individual. ' 29  The court preferred to recognize the
right of privacy if it were going to award relief when the action was called
by other names. Justice Denton, writing for the court, accomplished the
transition from the common law to the right of privacy by analogizing the
Billings wiretapping to eavesdropping, which was a common-law offense.
Wiretapping was an invasion of privacy as a form of eavesdropping.30
Damages. Before granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the
trial court had heard the Billings case on the tort theory of invasion of the
right of privacy. On special issues, the jury assessed $10,000 damages for
mental anguish and $15,000 exemplary damages.31 The plaintiff suffered
mental anguish from the invasion, but there was no resulting physical in-
jury. The supreme court sanctioned recovery for this tort despite the
absence of physical injury because it viewed the invasion of the right to
privacy as a "willful tort which constitutes a legal injury."' 32  Invasion of
the right to privacy in Texas is a dignatory tort so that the injury is "essen-
tially mental and subjective. '33 The standard for assessing damages is the
impact of the invasion upon a "person of ordinary sensibilities. '34
The court, however, neither overruled nor reconciled the previous opinions
of Harned v. E-Z Finance Co.35 and Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel,36
26 See note 6 supra, and accompanying text.
27 489 S.W.2d at 859-60.
28 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 197, 198, 213. "Indeed, the elasticity of
our law, its adaptability to new conditions, the capacity for growth, which has enabled
it to meet the wants of an everchanging society and to apply immediate relief for every
recognized wrong, have been its greatest boast." Id. at 213 n.1.
29 489 S.W.2d at 860.30 Id. When considering eavesdropping and variations of eavesdropping such as
wiretapping, courts have had no difficulty in labelling these activities as invasions of
privacy. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92,
2 S.E.2d 810 (1939); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964);
LaCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 114 Ohio App. 299, 182 N.E.2d 15 (1961). Eaves-
dropping is "the surreptitious overhearing, either directly by ear or by means of some
mechanical device such as a wiretap, microphone, or amplifier, of the words of another
spoken on a private occasion, or the preservation of such words by a tape recorder
or similar recording device." Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1296, 1297 (1967). Federal law
prohibits most wiretapping and provides for civil remedies. Crime Control Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).
31 489 S.W.2d at 859.321d. at 861.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 859.
35 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
86 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967).
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upon which the court of civil appeals relied in its denial of recovery for men-
tal suffering without physical injury.A7 In Harned the plaintiff sued for in-
tentional interference with peace of mind. The supreme court refused to
consider this proposed cause of action until the legislature acted. More
importantly, it strongly disapproved of any tort theory which allowed re-
covery for mental suffering without the inseparable physical injury.38 Fisher
was a more ambiguous decision. The supreme court held that "plaintiff was
entitled to actual damages for mental suffering due to the willful battery,
even in the absence of any physical injury."39 The core of that decision was
that the tort sued upon was willful; as a willful act, injury would be de-
termined by the fact of invasion and not by the "actual harm" which the
plaintiff suffered. 40  The application of the Fisher decision to damages for
mental suffering resulting from other intentional torts remained unclear, and
the Billings court did not clarify its interpretation of Fisher. The Billings
court cited invasion of privacy cases from Arkansas, 41 California, 42 and
Oregon4 3 to support its finding that damages for mental suffering only are
recoverable. But the court failed to reconcile previous Texas case law with
its new position on mental suffering. What is clear is that the plaintiff
in a privacy action need not allege physical injury to recover for mental
suffering.44
The Texas right of privacy, therefore, is an interest which the individual
has in maintaining his solitude and anonymity. The primary element is
invasion of that solitude by an action of ihe defendant which constituted in-
trusion, disclosure, publicity, or appropriation. Since the interests which
the remedy protects are mental and emotional and since the invasion is a
willful act, the court will not require special damages to maintain the action.
The Supreme Court of Texas has assured the individual that he has a
right to be left alone. The practical limitation of the tort, as shown by case
law from other states, is the necessity of convincing the trier of fact that
the plaintiff suffered an invasion because of the defendant's actions. Intru-
sion is apparently the easiest to prove.45 The physical act of intrusion is
usually enough to successfully support a claim for relief. The facts of
37 Billings v. Atkinson, 471 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1971).
38 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
89 424 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1967).
40 Id.
41 Olan Mills, Inc. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962) (photograph in
advertising without consent).
42 Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d
194 (1955) (name without consent).
48 Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941) (name without
consent).
44 See D. DOBBS, supra note 12, at 531:
[Tlhe courts tend to presume some harm of more than nominal nature in
the dignitary tort cases. Perhaps the real explanation for this is that some
of these suits serve public law purposes, since they often operate to en-
force limits upon the official or unofficial power of persons in authority
and to preserve rights of the public generally to be free from oppressive
conduct. It may well be that substantial damages are permitted in these
cases partly in recognition that such public purposes are being served
rather than in any belief that a person falsely arrested has suffered
humiliation worth $100,000.
45Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952) (landlord entering
premises without tenant's permission); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206
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Billings, for instance, clearly show intrusion by wiretapping despite the
court's refusal to require listening or publication as an element of intru-
sion.46 The elements of invasion are less well defined in an action involving
public disclosure or publicity, usually because of the plaintiff's difficulty
in alleging that his privacy was invaded.4 7  Most courts readily accept in-
vasion by appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness, 48 although there
are cases denying recovery.49
11. CONCLUSION
With Billings, the Texas court gives tort remedies to Texans which are
presumably available to the citizens of all but three other states. 50 The de-
cision is clearly in the trend of judicial thinking.-1 It is precipitous, however,
to define the tort in Texas much beyond the individual's right to be left
alone, because the court failed to decide some key issues. It is not com-
pletely clear after Billings whether the supreme court accepted the four varia-
tions of the right to privacy or merely accepted intrusion. Its definition of
the tort is broad and seemingly includes all four areas. 52 Furthermore, re-
covery for mental suffering remains an unclear area of Texas law. Plain-
tiffs, however, have more extensive rights as a result of the Billings deci-
sion's recognition of the right to privacy.
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A.2d 239 (1964) (recording device in tenants' bedroom); Nader v. General Motors
Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1970) (wiretapping
and eavesdropping by mechanical means).4 6 Accord, Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239, 242 (1964)
(wiretap): "The tort of intrusion on the plaintiffs' solitude or seclusion does not
require publicity and communication to third persons although this would affect the
amount of damages .... ." Certain wiretaps are legal. See, e.g., Crime Control Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970). Courts sometimes allow non-governmental monitoring
of telephone calls. See, e.g., Schmukler v. Ohio-Bell Tel. Co., 66 Ohio L. Abs. 213,
116 N.E.2d 819 (C.P., Cuyahoga Co. 1953) (pen and manual monitoring by telephone
company to determine use of subscriber's telephone).
47 Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 56 Del. 67, 189 A.2d 773 (1963) (news story
held not to violate "ordinary decencies"); Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243
(1944) (dicta that, while demurrer denied, jury might well decide that publication was
not an invasion); Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Pub. Co., 247 Iowa 817, 76 N.W.2d
762 (1956) (news story held to be news event); Martin v. Dorton, 210 Miss. 668, 50
So. 2d 391 (1951) (recovery denied because plaintiff, who was subject of news story,
was a public official who had, therefore, waived his right of privacy).
48 Olan Mills v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962); Eick v. Perk Dog
Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952); Pallas v. Crowley, Milner &
Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d 911 (1948); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652,
134 S.W. 1076 (1911); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55
(1938).
49 O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941) (dicta that famous
football player could not recover for use of his photograph even were Texas to recog-
nize the cause of action); Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Co., 351 Mass. 53, 217 N.E.2d
736 (1966) (demurrer granted because limited recognition of photograph of plaintiff
did not invade privacy).
50 Although not all states have affirmatively recognized the right of privacy, Texas
was previously one of only four states to reject the right. See notes 13-19 supra, and
accompanying text.51 When considering a choice of law question on whether to apply state law which
firmly rejects the right of privacy or state law that accepts it, federal judges will choose
the law of the state recognizing the right of privacy as the better law. Gravina v.
Brunswick Corp., 338 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.R.I. 1972) (name without consent); Young v.
That Was The Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337, 1339 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (name
without consent).
52 489 S.W.2d at 859.
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